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Abstract
In a sponsored search auction the advertisement slots on a search result page are generally
ordered by click-through rate. Bidders have a valuation, which is usually assumed to be linear
in the click-through rate, a budget constraint, and receive at most one slot per search result
page (round). We study multi-round sponsored search auctions, where the different rounds are
linked through the budget constraints of the bidders and the valuation of a bidder for all rounds
is the sum of the valuations for the individual rounds. All mechanisms published so far either
study one-round sponsored search auctions [1, 2] or the setting where every round has only one
slot and all slots have the same click-through rate, which is identical to a multi-item auction [7].
This paper contains the following three results: (1) We give the first mechanism for the multi-
round sponsored search problem where different slots have different click-through rates. Our
mechanism is incentive compatible in expectation, individually rational in expectation, Pareto
optimal in expectation, and also ex-post Pareto optimal for each realized outcome. (2) Addi-
tionally we study the combinatorial setting, where each bidder is only interested in a subset
of the rounds. We give a deterministic, incentive compatible, individually rational, and Pareto
optimal mechanism for the setting where all slots have the same click-through rate. (3) We
present an impossibility result for auctions where bidders have diminishing marginal valuations.
Specifically, we show that even for the multi-unit (one slot per round) setting there is no incen-
tive compatible, individually rational, and Pareto optimal mechanism for private diminishing
marginal valuations and public budgets.
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1 Introduction
In sponsored search (or adword) auctions advertisers bid on keywords. The valuation of these
bidders for the keywords is used in the generalized second price auction, which is utilized by firms
such as Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft [9]. The valuation of the bidders is private knowledge. Slots
for ads are usually ordered by their public click-through rate (CTR), which is decreasing by the
position of the slots on a search result page (round). Each bidder is assigned at most one slot in a
round and his valuation for a slot is assumed to depend linearly on the CTR. Moreover, valuations
are assumed to be additive, i.e., the total valuation of a bidder is equal to the sum of his valuations
for all the slots that are assigned to him.
A further key ingredient of an adword auction is that bidders specify a budget on the pay-
ment charged for the ads, linking the different rounds. The deterministic Vickrey auction [14]
was designed to maximize social welfare in settings where all items are different and bidders have
arbitrary valuation functions. However, deterministic and incentive compatible auctions that max-
imize social welfare do not exist for the multi-unit1 case for general valuations if there are private
budget constraints. This was shown in the seminal paper by Dobzinski, Lavi, and Nisan [6, 7].
They considered the multi-unit case with additive valuations, which in the sponsored search setting
corresponds to slots with identical CTR, each round with only one slot for sale. They gave an
incentive compatible auction based on Ausubel’s ascending clinching auction [3] that produces a
Pareto optimal allocation if budgets are public. They also showed that this assumption is strictly
needed, i.e., that no deterministic mechanism for private budgets exists if we insist on incentive
compatibility and on obtaining an allocation that achieves some form of efficiency. Pareto optimal-
ity is a basic notion for the efficiency of an allocation. It seems to be the least one should aim for.
If an allocation was not Pareto optimal then bidders could trade amongst themselves and improve
their utilities, thus increasing efficiency.
We show that the multi-unit auction of [6, 7] can be adapted to deal with heterogeneous items
as in the real-life setting of adword auctions, thus, allowing us to study adword auctions with
multiple slots, multiple rounds, and budgets. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to do
so. We specifically model the case of several slots with different CTR available for each round
and a bound on the number of slots (usually one) that can be allocated to a bidder per round.
Since the impossibility result of [6, 7] for multi-unit auctions applies also to the adword setting,
achieving deterministic, incentive compatible, individually rational, and Pareto optimal auctions
is only possible if budgets are public. In this paper, we first provide a deterministic, incentive
compatible, individually rational, and Pareto optimal auction that provides a fractional allocation
for the case of one round where slots are divisible. We then show how to probabilistically round
this fractional allocation for the divisible case to an integer allocation for the indivisible case
with multiple rounds (i.e., the adword setting) and get an auction that is incentive compatible in
expectation, individually rational in expectation, and Pareto optimal.
Furthermore, we address the more general case of combinatorial auctions with bidders having a
non-zero identical valuation only on a subset of the rounds. This case can arise, for example, if each
round represents a different keyword. Valuations are additive and each bidder is assigned at most
one slot for a given round, but we restrict the model by allowing only identical slots for each round,
i.e., we require that all slots have the same CTR. This setting extends the model considered by [10]
to multiple slots. We present a variation of the clinching auction that is deterministic, incentive
compatible, individually rational, and Pareto optimal.
Finally, we also study non-additive valuations, namely valuations with diminishing marginal
1In the multi-unit case multiple homogeneous items are sold.
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valuations. Diminishing marginal valuation functions are widely used to model auction settings with
marginal utilities being positive non-increasing functions of the number of items already allocated
to the bidders. We show that even in the multi-unit (one slot per round) case there is no incentive
compatible, individually rational, and Pareto optimal auction for private diminishing marginal
valuations and public budgets.
Technical contributions. We briefly describe our technical contributions.
(1) The clinching auction of [6, 7] repeatedly increases the price for an item and checks whether
the demand still allows to sell all the remaining unsold items. We extend this to adword auctions
with divisible slots as follows: We define a price “per capacity” and give different weights to different
slots depending on their CTRs. To perform the check whether all remaining unsold items can still
be sold we solve suitable linear programs. To show the Pareto optimality of the modified auction
we give a novel characterization of Pareto optimality for adword auctions. We then show that if
the outcome of the auction did not fulfill this new characterization then one of the linear programs
solved by the auction would not have computed an optimal solution. Since this is not possible, it
follows that the outcome is Pareto optimal.
(2) After solving the divisible case we round the outcome for the divisible case to the indivisible
case. This requires a novel swapping algorithm that guarantees that each bidder receives at most
one slot of each round.
(3) The single-valued combinatorial auction of [10] solves the combinatorial auction problem
over rounds, where each round has only one slot. We extend their techniques to the multi-slot per
round setting as follows: (a) We extend their B-matchings based approach by giving capacities,
equal to the number of unsold slots, to nodes that represent keywords. (b) We extend the concept
of trading paths, which in turn allows us to give a characterization of Pareto optimality for the
multi-slot case. While in the single-slot case it is sufficient to restrict the attention to simple trading
paths, in our case there might be trading options where the same bidder or item can appear many
times along the same path. The crucial insight is that there always exists a simple trading path
whenever there exists a non-simple one.
(4) For the impossibility proof for diminishing marginal valuations we consider a simple scenario
of two bidders and two one-slot rounds, i.e., this is a two-unit setting. We show that under certain
conditions on the marginal valuations and the budgets, any incentive compatible, individually
rational, and Pareto optimal auction must assign both rounds to one of the two bidders. However,
we also present an example where the other bidder will instead receive one of the rounds if he
overbids on the second marginal valuation.
Further related work. Ascending clinching auctions are used in the FCC spectrum auctions,
see [12, 4, 3]. For a motivation of our adword auctions see [13] on Google’s auction for TV ads.
Fiat et al. [10] studied an extension of the multi-unit case of [6] to a combinatorial setting where
items are distinct and different bidders may be interested in different items. The auction presented
in [10] is incentive compatible and Pareto optimal for additive valuations and single-valued bidders
(i.e., every bidder does not distinguish between the keywords in his interest set). This result is
possible only if the sets of interest are public. Bhattacharya et al. [5] showed that for one infinitely
divisible item, a bidder cannot improve his utility by underreporting his budget. This leads to
a randomized incentive compatible in expectation algorithm for one infinitely divisible item with
both private valuations and budgets. Aggarwal et al. [1] and Ashlagi et al. [2] studied envy-free
outcomes that are bidder optimal, respectively Pareto optimal in an one-round adword auction.
In this setting they give (under certain conditions in [1]) an incentive compatible auction with
both private valuations and budgets. Recently, Lavi and May [11] and Dütting et al. [8] showed
impossibility results for public budgets in various settings with heterogeneous items.
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In Section 2 we give notation and preliminary definitions. In Section 3 we present the clinching
auction for divisible non-identical slots. In Section 4 we show how to round a solution for the divis-
ible case to the multi-round indivisible case. In Section 5 we study the single-valued combinatorial
case with multiple identical slots, and in Section 6 we show the impossibility result for the case of
diminishing marginal valuation functions. All omitted proofs are in the appendix.
2 Problem statement and definitions
We have n bidders and m slots. We call the set of bidders I := {1, . . . , n} and the set of slots
J := {1, . . . ,m}. Each bidder i ∈ I has a private valuation vi, a public budget bi, and a public
demand constraint κi, which is a positive integer. Each slot j ∈ J has a quality αj . The bidders
and the slots are ordered such that vi ≥ vi′ if i > i
′ and αj ≥ αj′ if j > j
′, where ties are broken in
some arbitrary but fixed order.
The divisible case. The goal is to assign each bidder i a fraction xi,j ≥ 0 of each slot j and charge
him a payment pi. A matrix X = (xi,j)(i,j)∈I×J and a payment vector p are called an allocation
(X, p). We call ci =
∑
j∈J αjxi,j the weighted capacity allocated to bidder i. An allocation is legal
if it fulfills the following conditions: (1)
∑
j∈J xi,j ≤ κi ∀i ∈ I, (2)
∑
i∈I xi,j = 1 ∀j ∈ J , and (3)
bi ≥ pi ∀i ∈ I.
The indivisible case. We additionally have a set R of rounds or keywords, where |R| is public.
The goal is to assign each slot j ∈ J of round r ∈ R to one bidder i ∈ I while obeying the demand
constraint of each bidder in each round. A three-dimensional matrix X = (xi,j,r)(i,j,r)∈I×J×R with
xi,j,r = 1 if slot j is assigned to bidder i in round r, and xi,j,r = 0 otherwise, and a payment vector
p form an allocation (X, p). We call ci =
∑
j∈J
αj
|R|(
∑
r∈R xi,j,r) the weighted capacity allocated to
bidder i. An allocation is legal if it fulfills the following conditions: (1)
∑
j∈J xi,j,r ≤ κi ∀i ∈ I,∀r ∈
R, (2)
∑
i∈I xi,j,r = 1 ∀j ∈ J,∀r ∈ R, and (3) bi ≥ pi ∀i ∈ I.
The combinatorial indivisible case. In the combinatorial case not all rounds respectively
keywords are identical. Every bidder i ∈ I has a publicly known set of interest Si ⊆ R. This
corresponds to valuation vi for all keywords in Si and valuation 0 for all other keywords. We model
this case by imposing xi,j,r = 0 ∀r /∈ Si.
Properties of the auctions. The utility of bidder i for the legal allocation (X, p) is defined by
ui = civi − pi. The allocation must obey the following conditions: (Bidder rationality) ui ≥ 0
for all bidders i ∈ I, (Auctioneer rationality) the utility of the auctioneer fulfills
∑
i∈I pi ≥ 0, and
(No positive transfer) pi ≥ 0 for all bidders i ∈ I. An allocation that is both bidder rational and
auctioneer rational is called individually rational. An allocation (X, p) is Pareto optimal if there is
no other allocation (X ′, p′) such that (1) the utility of none bidder in (X, p) is less than his utility
in (X ′, p′), (2) the utility of the auctioneer in (X, p) is no less than his utility in (X ′, p′), and (3)
at least one bidder or the auctioneer is better off in (X ′, p′) compared with (X, p). An auction is
incentive compatible if it is a dominant strategy for all bidders to reveal their true valuation. An
auction is said to be Pareto optimal if the allocation it produces is Pareto optimal. A randomized
auction is Pareto optimal in expectation if the above conditions hold in expectation.
We show that our randomized mechanism for indivisible slots is Pareto optimal in expectation
and that each realized outcome is Pareto optimal. Note that neither of these conditions implies
each other. Let us assume that we have two bidders, a single indivisible item, and a uniformly
distributed random variable Y ∼ U(0, 1). Consider first the case that bidder 1 has valuation v1 = 1
and budget b1 = 1, bidder 2 has valuation v2 = 2 and budget b2 = 1, and we have a value y˜ ∈ (0, 1).
If we sell the item to the bidder 2 for price p2 = 1 (and p1 = 0) for every realization y of Y with
y 6= y˜ the outcome is Pareto optimal in expectation. However, only if we sell the item to bidder 2
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also for y = y˜ every possibly realized outcome is Pareto optimal. Hence, Pareto optimality in
expectation does not imply that each realized outcome is Pareto optimal. Next consider the case
that bidder 1 has valuation v1 = 1 and budget b1 = 1, and bidder 2 has valuation v2 = 2 and budget
b2 = 0.5. If we sell the item to bidder 1 for price p1 = 1 (and p2 = 0) for every realization y ∈ (0, 1)
each realized outcome is Pareto optimal because v1 > b2. However, we could select the bidder who
gets the item with probability one half, and both bidders have to pay p1 = p2 = 0.5 independent
of the assignment. Hence, the outcome is not Pareto optimal in expectation, and therefore, Pareto
optimality in expectation is not implied if every realized outcome is Pareto optimal.
3 Deterministic clinching auction for the divisible case
3.1 Characterization of Pareto optimality
Given a legal allocation (X, p), a swap between two bidders i and i′ is a fractional exchange of
slots, i.e., if there are slots j and j′ and a constant τ > 0 with xi,j ≥ τ and xi′,j′ ≥ τ then a swap
between i and i′ gives a new legal (X ′, p) with x′i,j = xi,j − τ , x
′
i′,j′ = xi′,j′ − τ , x
′
i,j′ = xi,j′ + τ , and
x′i′,j = xi′,j + τ . If αj < αj′ then the swap increases i’s weighted capacity. We assume throughout
this section that the number of slots m fulfills m =
∑
i∈I κi. To characterize Pareto optimal
allocations we first define for each bidder i the set Ni of bidders such that for every bidder i
′ in Ni
there exists a swap between i and i′ that increases i’s weighted capacity. Given a legal allocation
(X, p) we use h′(i) := max{j ∈ J |xi,j > 0} for the slot with the highest quality that is assigned
to bidder i and l(i) := min{j ∈ J |xi,j > 0} for the slot with the lowest quality that is assigned to
bidder i. To consider the case of slots with equal α-value we define h(i) := min{j ∈ J |αj = αh′(i)}.
Now, Ni = {a ∈ I|h(a) > l(i)}. To model sequences of swaps we define furthermore N
k
i = Ni for
k = 1 and Nki =
⋃
a∈Nk−1
i
Na for k > 1. Since we have only n bidders,
⋃n
k=1N
k
i =
⋃n′
k=1N
k
i for all
n′ ≥ n. We define N˜i :=
⋃n
k=1N
k
i \ {i} and v˜i = mina∈N˜i(va) if N˜i 6= ∅ and v˜i = ∞ else. Given a
legal allocation (X, p) we use B := {i ∈ I|bi > pi} to denote the set of bidders who have a positive
remaining budget.
Theorem 1. If v˜i ≥ vi ∀i ∈ B then the respective legal allocation (X, p) is Pareto optimal.
We say that a legal allocation (X, p) contains a trading swap sequence (for short trading swap) if
there exists a legal allocation (X ′, p′) and two bidders u,w ∈ I such that (1) bidder w ∈ N˜u, (2) for
all i ∈ I \{u,w} it holds that
∑
j∈J αjxi,j =
∑
j∈J αjx
′
i,j and pi = p
′
i, (3) δ :=
∑
j∈J αj(x
′
u,j−xu,j) =∑
j∈J αj(xw,j − x
′
w,j) > 0, (4) vuδ > p
′
u − pu = pw − p
′
w = vwδ, and (5) bu ≥ p
′
u. We say that the
allocation (X ′, p′) results from the trading swap.
Theorem 2. (a) Given a legal allocation (X, p) such that ∃u ∈ B : v˜u < vu then there exists
a trading swap in (X, p). (b) If there exists a trading swap in (X, p) then the allocation (X ′, p′)
resulting from the trading swap is a legal allocation that is Pareto superior to (X, p).
Proof. We know that there is a bidder u ∈ B with v˜u < vu. Thus, we can select the smallest k ∈
{1, . . . , n} for which there is a bidder ak ∈ N
k
u who has vak = v˜u. We define for all p ∈ {1, . . . , k−1}
the bidder ap such that ap ∈ N
p
u and ap+1 ∈ Nap and set a0 := u. Since we selected the smallest
k, we know that ap 6= ap′ if p 6= p
′. The fact that ap+1 ∈ Nap implies that h(ap+1) > l(ap). Hence,
we could swap a fraction of size ǫp+1 := min{xap,l(ap), xap+1,h(ap+1)} of the slots h(ap+1) and l(ap)
between the bidders ap+1 and ap with p ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}. Such a swap increases the weighted capacity
that is assigned to bidder ap by δp+1 := ǫp+1(αh(ap+1) − αl(ap)), while the weighted capacity that is
assigned to bidder ap+1 is decreased by δp+1. We define δ := min({
ba0−pa0
vak
} ∪ {δp|p ∈ {1, . . . , k}})
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and τp+1 :=
δ
αh(ap+1)−αl(ap)
∀p ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} and define an allocation (X ′, p′) as follows: We
set x′ap,h(ap+1) := xap,h(ap+1) + τp+1 and x
′
ap,l(ap)
:= xap,l(ap) − τp+1 for all p ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1},
x′ap,h(ap) := xap,h(ap) − τp and x
′
ap,l(ap−1)
:= xap,l(ap−1) + τp for all p ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and x
′
i,j = xi,j for
all other (i, j) ∈ I × J . Moreover, we set p′ak := pak − vakδ, p
′
a0
:= pa0 + vakδ, and p
′
i := pi for all
other i ∈ I. Thus, with w = ak it follows that (X
′, p′) fulfills conditions (1)-(5) of a trading swap.
Next we show that (X ′, p′) is a legal allocation. By the definition of X ′ for all i ∈ I it holds
that
∑
j∈J x
′
i,j =
∑
j∈J xi,j = κi as whenever for some τ with −1 ≤ τ ≤ 1, x
′
i,j is set to xi,j + τ for
some j ∈ J , x′i,l is set to xi,l − τ for some other l ∈ J . Additionally for every j ∈ J it holds that∑
i∈I x
′
i,j =
∑
i∈I xi,j = 1 as whenever x
′
ap,j
is set to xap,j + τ for some τ with −1 ≤ τ ≤ 1, either
x′ap+1,j is set to xap+1,j − τ , or x
′
ap−1,j
is set to xap−1,j − τ . Finally, p
′
i ≤ pi ≤ bi for all i 6= u and by
our construction p′u ≤ bu. This shows that conditions (1) - (3) of a legal allocation hold for (X
′, p′).
The proof of (b) follows directly from the definition of a trading swap since the utility of no
bidder or the auctioneer is decreased, but the utility of bidder u is increased.
3.2 Multiple round auction for the divisible case
In this section, we describe our deterministic auction for divisible slots and show that it is Pareto
optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible. A formal description is given in the
procedure Auction and the procedure Sell. We assume throughout this section that (1) each
bidder i ∈ I has a private valuation vi ∈ N+
2, a public budget constraint bi ∈ Q≥1, and a public
demand constraint κi ∈ N+, and (2) each slot j ∈ J has a public quality αj ∈ Q+. From now on
the order of the bidders is independent of their valuations and their budgets.
Before we start the auction, we add
∑
i∈I κi − |J | dummy-slots with quality zero to the set
of slots J if
∑
i∈I κi > |J | and we remove the |J | −
∑
i∈I κi slots with the lowest quality αj out
of the set of slots J if
∑
i∈I κi < |J |. Thus, the demand constraints
∑
j∈J xi,j ≤ κi ∀i ∈ I
and the condition
∑
i∈I xi,j = 1 ∀j ∈ J imply that each legal allocation fulfills even
∑
j∈J xi,j =
κi ∀i ∈ I. Furthermore, we have to assign to each bidder i ∈ I an initial weighted capacity of
ci = minJ ′⊆J,|J ′|=κi(
∑
j∈J ′ αj) for a price of zero at the beginning of the auction. If some bidder i
obtained less weighted capacity at termination, we could not assign all the slots fully to the bidders.
The state of the auction is defined by the current price π, the weighted capacity ci that bidder
i ∈ I has clinched so far, and the payment pi that has been charged so far to bidder i. Furthermore,
we have the price of the next iteration π+ that is π+ = π+ 1 with the exception of the initial step
when we set π+ = ⌊π⌋+ 1. Note that the initial choice of π in line 7 guarantees that π ≤ 1. Since
we assume that vi ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ I and bi ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ I, it follows that every agent can afford to buy at this
price at least e weighted capacity. The value e is defined such that for all i ∈ I the sum e + ci is
an upper bound of the weighted capacity that can be acquired by bidder i. Following the clinching
auction in [5, 7] we do not increase the price that a bidder i ∈ I has to pay from π to π+ for all
bidders at the same time. Instead, we call Sell each time before we increase the price for a single
bidder. We define the set of active bidders A ⊆ I which are all those i ∈ A with π ≤ vi, and the
subset E of A of exiting bidders which are all those i ∈ A with π+ > vi. If the price that bidder
i ∈ A has to pay for a unit is π then his demand is di =
bi−pi
π
. If the price he has to pay was already
increased to π+ then his demand is di =
bi−pi
π+
. In this case, the demand corresponds to d+i that is
always equal to bi−pi
π+
. Different from the auction in [5, 7] a bidder with di = d
+
i is also charged the
increased price π+ if he receives additional weighted capacity. Since no bidder will ever pay more
than his reported valuation and the demand is set so that bi ≥ pi, individual rationality follows.
2All the arguments go through if we simply assume that vi ∈ Q+ ∀i ∈ I and there exists a publicly known value
z ∈ R+ such that vi ≥ z for every bidder i ∈ I , and for all bidders i and i
′ either vi = vi′ or |vi − vi′ | ≥ z.
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Algorithm 1 Clinching Auction for Divisible Slots.
1: procedure Auction(I, J, α, κ, v, b)
2: A← I; pi ← 0 ∀i ∈ I
3: \\ ci is the minimal capacity achievable by agent i
4: ci ← minJ ′⊆J,|J ′|=κi(
∑
j∈J ′ αj) ∀i ∈ I
5: \\ e+ ci is an upper bound on the capacity achievable by agent i
6: e← maxJ ′⊆J,J ′′⊆J,|J ′|=|J ′′|(
∑
j∈J ′ αj −
∑
j∈J ′′ αj)
7: π ← 1max{1,e} ; π
+ ← ⌊π⌋+ 1; di ←
bi
π
∀i ∈ I
8: while
∑
i∈I ci <
∑
j∈J αj do
9: E ← {i ∈ A|π+ > vi}
10: for i ∈ E do
11: (X, s)← Sell(I, J, α, κ, v, c, d, i)
12: (ci, pi, di)← (ci + s, pi + sπ, 0)
13: end for
14: A← A \ E
15: d+i ←
bi−pi
π+
∀i ∈ A
16: while ∃i ∈ A with di 6= d
+
i do
17: i′ ← min({i ∈ A|di 6= d
+
i })
18: for i ∈ A \ i′ do
19: (X, s)← Sell(I, J, α, κ, v, c, d, i)
20: pi ←
{
pi + sπ, if di 6= d
+
i
pi + sπ
+, else
21: (ci, di, d
+
i )← (ci + s, di − s,
bi−pi
π+
)
22: end for
23: (X, s)← Sell(I, J, α, κ, v, c, d, i′)
24: (ci′ , pi′)← (ci′ + s, pi′ + sπ)
25: d+i′ ←
bi′−pi′
π+
; di′ ← d
+
i′
26: end while
27: π ← π+; π+ ← π+ + 1
28: end while
29: return (X, p)
30: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Determine the amount that bidder i′ clinches.
1: procedure Sell(I, J, α, κ, v, c, d, i′)
2: compute an optimal solution of the following linear program
that is a vertex of the polytope defined by its constraints:
minimize γi′
s.t.: (a)
∑
i∈I xi,j = 1 ∀j ∈ J
(b)
∑
j∈J xi,j = κi ∀i ∈ I
(c)
∑
j∈J xi,j αj − γi = ci ∀i ∈ I
(d) γi ≤ di ∀i ∈ I
(e) xi,j ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ J
(f) γi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I
3: return (X, γi′)
4: end procedure
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Let us now detail the idea of the auction and explain why it is incentive compatible. The crucial
point of the auction is that we do only sell the weighted capacity s that we compute in Sell to the
bidder i at a certain price π or π+ if we cannot sell s to the other bidders. We check that condition
by solving the linear program in Sell. For each iteration of the outer while-loop we first call Sell
for each exiting bidder i and sell him s for price π. This is the last time when he can gain weighted
capacity. Afterward, he is no longer an active bidder. Next, we call Sell for each of the remaining
active bidders that are not exiting and sell them the respective s. Afterward, we increase the price
of a single active bidder to π+ and call Sell for every active bidder again. We continue until the
price of each active bidder is increased to π+. We can now set π to π+ and π+ to π+ + 1.
By the construction of the auction, each bidder i pays never more than his reported valuation.
If his reported valuation is v˜i and v˜i < vi, he becomes an inactive bidder at the price v˜i. His utility
cannot increase as he gets the same weighted capacity for each price π < v˜i and not more for price
v˜i. If his reported valuation is v˜i > vi, he gets the same weighted capacity for each price π < vi
and his utility cannot increase as well. Thus, the auction is incentive compatible.
During the auction, procedure Sell guarantees us the existence of legal allocations. The pro-
cedure solves a linear program. As discussed above, the initial price is set so low that the first call
to Sell is guaranteed to have a feasible solution since each bidder i ∈ I has enough budget to buy
the weighted capacity γi in every possible (X, γ) with
∑
j∈J xi,j = κi. Thus, there exists an optimal
solution (X, γ), where nothing is assigned to a certain bidder i′ (i.e., γi′ = 0).
If (X, γ) is an optimal solution of the linear program in a call to Sell that minimizes γi′ , then
ci′ is increased by γi′ after Sell, and thus, (X, γ˜) with γ˜i = γi for i 6= i
′ and γ˜i′ = 0 for i = i
′ is a
feasible solution of the linear program in the next call to Sell, which uses the new c-values. Since
γ˜i′ = 0, (X, γ˜) is a feasible solution in the next call even if the price for bidder i
′ was increased,
and thus, his demand was decreased. A repeated application of this argument shows that the final
assignment X and γ = 0 is a feasible solution of the linear program in Sell at the conclusion of
the auction. As bi ≥ pi for every bidder i, it follows that the allocation (X, p) computed by the
auction is legal.
All the coefficients of the affine functions used in the constraints of the first linear program
that gets solved during the auction are rational numbers and all the linear programs have feasible
solutions. Thus, there exists an optimal solution that is a vertex of the polytope that is defined by
the constraints of the respective linear program. Since that optimal solution lies on the intersection
of the graphs of affine functions with rational coefficients it follows that the selected optimal solution
(X, γ) has only rational entries. The prices are rational numbers as well, and thus, ci and di are
rational numbers for all i ∈ I in the next iteration. Hence, the allocation (X, p) that is determined
by the auction has only rational entries. We use that property in the next section.
We show finally that the allocation (X, p) our auction computes does not contain any trading
swap, and thus, by Theorem 1 and 2 it is Pareto optimal. The proof shows that every trading swap
in (X, p) would lead to a superior solution to one of the linear programs solved by the mechanism.
Since the mechanism found the optimal solution this leads to a contradiction.
Theorem 3. The allocation (X, p) produced by the auction does not contain any trading swap.
4 Multiple round randomized auction for the indivisible case
We will now use the allocation computed by the deterministic auction for divisible slots to give a
randomized auction for |R| rounds and indivisible slots. The randomized auction has to assign to
every slot j ∈ J exactly one bidder i ∈ I for each round r ∈ R.
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Given an input for the indivisible case we can use it as an input for the divisible case; the set
of bidders I and their κi and bi, and the set of slots J and their αj stay unchanged. Based on the
allocation (X, p) for the divisible problem we construct a matrix M ′ of size |J | × λ, where λ is the
least common denominator of all the xi,j values and where each column of M
′ corresponds to a
legal assignment for the indivisible one-round case. We then pick |R| times one column uniformly
at random from the columns of M ′. The r-th such column gives the assignment of bidders to slots
for round r. All the columns together form the |J | × |R| matrix N . We show that the randomized
auction is (a) individually rational in expectation, (b) incentive compatible in expectation, (c)
Pareto optimal in expectation, and (d) each realized outcome is ex-post Pareto optimal.
We use the payment determined for the divisible problem as payment for the allocations in
the indivisible case and show below that the expected weighted capacity of each bidder equals
his weighted capacity in the divisible problem. Thus, the expected utility of each bidder in the
indivisible case is equal to his utility in the derived divisible case (Utility equivalence). It follows
that the randomized auction is individually rational in expectation and incentive compatible in
expectation.
Lemma 1. For every probability distribution over legal allocations in the indivisible case there exists
a legal allocation (X, p) in the divisible case such that the utility of the bidders and the auctioneer
equals their expected utility using this probability distribution.
By Lemma 1 any probability distribution over legal allocations in the indivisible case that is
Pareto superior to the distribution generated by our auction would lead to a legal Pareto superior
allocation for the divisible case. This is not possible since the allocation computed by our auction
for the divisible case is Pareto optimal. This shows that the allocation for the indivisible case is
Pareto optimal in expectation. Moreover, every realized outcome for the indivisible case is ex-post
Pareto optimal: if in the indivisible case there would exist a Pareto superior allocation to one of the
allocations that gets chosen with a positive probability, then a Pareto superior expected allocation
would exist in the indivisible case.
We describe next how to convert the legal allocation of the derived divisible problem into a legal
allocation of the indivisible problem such that utility equivalence is guaranteed. We first discretize
the allocation X as follows. Recall that all xi,j are rational numbers. Let λ be their least common
denominator, set C = {1, . . . , λ} and set yi,j = λxi,j. Since
∑
i∈I xi,j = 1 and
∑
j∈J xi,j ≤ κi, we
know that
∑
i∈I yi,j = λ and
∑
j∈J yi,j ≤ λκi. We construct a matrix M of size |J | × |C| with
values in I by setting yi,j values of row j to i. More formally, for each j ∈ J and each c ∈ C
we set entry mj,c = v for the unique value v with
∑v−1
i=1 yi,j < c and
∑v
i=1 yi,j ≥ c. As a result
|{c ∈ C|mj,c = i}| = yi,j ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ J . The demand constraints imply that there are at most |C|κi
entries in M that have the value i ∈ I. Next, we replace each bidder i by κi pseudo-bidders and
translate M into a matrix M˜ such that no pseudo-bidder has more than |C| entries in M˜ . Then we
apply to M˜ a swapping algorithm that guarantees that (1) in each column in M˜ there is at most
one entry for each pseudo-bidder, and (2) for each j ∈ J each value appears as often in row j of M˜
as it does in M˜ ′. Thus, when we convert all the entries of the pseudo-bidders of a given bidder i
into entries for bidder i we get a matrix M ′ such that each bidder i has at most κi entries in each
column and for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J it holds that |{c ∈ C|m′j,c = i}| = yi,j. Details are given in the
appendix. The columns of matrix M ′ are then used in the sampling step.
Theorem 4. Given a matrix M of size |J | × |C| with entries valued in I and where each value
appears in at most |C| entries, there exists a swapping algorithm that finds a matrix M ′ with the
same size and where (1) each value appears as often in row j of M ′ as it appears in row j of M
and (2) each value appears in at most one entry of each column of M ′.
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The allocation of the randomized auction for multiple rounds and indivisible slots is now con-
structed as follows. We assign randomly and with equal probability 1|C| one of the columns of
matrix M ′ to the r-th column of matrix N for each column respectively round r ∈ R. We set the
random variable zi,j,r to 1 if bidder i is assigned slot j in round r, and to 0 otherwise. The expected
weighted capacity allocated to bidder i ∈ I is thus
E(
∑
j∈J
αj
|R|
∑
r∈R
zi,j,r) =
∑
j∈J
αj
|R|
∑
r∈R
Ezi,j,r =
∑
j∈J
αj
yi,j
|C|
=
∑
j∈J
αjxi,j.
This proves utility equivalence. Additionally, all of the slots are fully assigned to the bidders, and
hence, the stated properties are fulfilled by the randomized auction.
5 The single-valued combinatorial case with multiple slots
In this section we consider single-valued combinatorial auctions with multiple identical slots in
multiple rounds. We interpret the different slots in a round as multiple instances of the same item.
Every bidder i ∈ I has valuation vi on all rounds of his preference set Si. All other rounds are
valued zero. The preference sets Si and the budgets bi are public knowledge. We further restrict
to the case of at most one slot per round allocated to a single bidder, i.e., κi = 1. We also require
that at least m bidders are interested in each round.
A feasible allocation (H, p) is characterized by a tuple H = (H1,H2, . . . ,Hn) where Hi ⊆
Si represents the set of items that are allocated to bidder i, and by a vector of payments p =
(p1, p2, . . . , pn) with pi ≤ bi for all i in I. The utility of bidder i is defined by ui := vi|Hi| − pi. The
utility of the auctioneer is
∑n
i=1 pi. In the combinatorial case we base the allocation of the items in
the clinching auction on B-matchings computed on a bipartite graph G with the vertex set I ∪R
and the edge set {(i, t) ∈ I ×R|t ∈ Si}. The B-matchings are subgraphs of G with maximal weight
that fulfill the degree constraints of the vertices that are defined in the constraint vector B. We
slightly abuse notation by using H to denote both: the sets of the items that are allocated to the
bidders, and the B-matching that describes the allocation in graph G.
Pareto optimality has been related in previous work [10, 6] to the non-existence of trading
options between bidders. We need a new definition of a trading path because we consider multisets
of items.
Definition 1. A path σ = (a1, t1, a2, t2, . . . , aj−1, tj−1, aj) is an alternating path with respect to
an assignment H if (ai, ti) ∈ H, ti ∈ Si+1, and ti 6∈ Hi+1 for all 1 ≤ i < j.
Definition 2. A path σ = (a1, t1, a2, t2, . . . , aj−1, tj−1, aj) is a trading path with respect to alloca-
tion (H, p) if the following holds: (1) σ is an alternating path in H, (2) the valuation of bidder aj is
strictly greater than the valuation of bidder a1 (i.e., vaj > va1), (3) the remaining (unused) budget
b∗aj of bidder aj at the conclusion of the auction is at least the valuation of bidder a1 (i.e., b
∗
aj
≥ va1).
Observe that the condition ti 6∈ Hi+1 is needed in this case since the slots of a round have to
be assigned to different bidders. This is not the case in the definition of alternating paths given
in [10]. Moreover, we do not restrict in principle to simple alternating paths (without cycles) as
in [10]. We call two alternating paths Pareto equivalent if they have the same start and end bidders
and produce the same change in weighted capacity for all the bidders. We are able to prove the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. If there exists an alternating path σ = (a1, t1, . . . , tj−1, aj) that contains cycles there
exists also a Pareto equivalent simple alternating path.
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Pareto optimality and simple trading paths are now related by the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Any allocation (H, p) is Pareto optimal if and only if (1) all slots of the rounds are
sold in (H, p), and (2) there are no simple trading paths in (H, p).
We define the auction in Algorithm 4. During the execution of the algorithm there is always a
price π (initially zero), a set of unsold items R (i.e., of items with unsold instances) of cardinality
r¯ = |R|, a vector of remaining budgets b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn), and a vector of the number of unsold
slots that are instances of the same item (c1, c2, . . . , cr¯). We denote by U the multiset formed by
the multiset-union of the unsold slots of all items and by t¯ =
∑r¯
i=1 ci its cardinality. The current
demand of bidder i during the course of the auction is the number of slots that bidder i could clinch
at price π and is denoted by di. It is either equal to Di or to D
+
i , which are defined as follows:
Di(π, r¯, b) :=
{
min{r¯, |Si|, ⌊
bi
π
⌋}, if π ≤ vi
0, else
D+i (π, r¯, b) := lim
ǫ→0+
Di(π + ǫ, r¯, b)
We now define the set A := {i ∈ I|Di > 0} of bidders with positive demand and the subset
E := {i ∈ I|Di > 0∧ vi = π} of the bidders in A with valuation equal to the current price. Bidders
in A are called active bidders whereas bidders in E are called exiting bidders.
The auction continues, as long as there is a bidder that belongs to A. At every price π we
first try to sell slots to any exiting bidder because even if the utility of the exiting bidder does not
increase with the new item, the utility of the auctioneer will. After this check, we have to verify
if any bidder can clinch any slot and eventually sell that slot to him. We denote by B({¬i}) the
number of slots assigned to bidders other than i in a maximal B-matching, and assign to bidder i
the minimal number of items amongst all the maximal B-matchings. An item is clinched by bidder i
when B(¬{i}) < t¯. If no item is clinched, we set di = D
+
i for a bidder i with di > D
+
i , and this
loop continues until no bidder i can clinch an item and di = D
+
i ∀i ∈ I. Only now we can raise the
price. The preference sets, the vector of the number of unsold slots, and the set of unsold items are
updated after every time a bidder clinches. The idea of the auction is to sell slots at the highest
possible price such that all slots are sold and there exists no competition between bidders. On the
contrary, the existence of a trading path indicates that there exists competition on the assignment
of the first slot in the path. Hence, the auction contains no trading path in the final allocation.
Theorem 6. The allocation (H∗, p∗) produced by Algorithm 4 is incentive compatible, individually
rational, and Pareto optimal.
6 Impossibility result for diminishing marginal valuations
In this scenario every valuation vi is a diminishing marginal valuation function, shaped on value
vi(q) : {1, . . . , |R|} → R+. The initial Ausubel clinching auction [3] was indeed proposed for the
case of diminishing marginal utilities without budgets. Since we consider only the case of indivisible
items in this section, marginal values are constant in every unit interval.
We show that even in the case of two identical items and public budgets, it is impossible to
design an auction that is incentive compatible and Pareto optimal if marginal valuations are private.
The problem is that agents can lie over their own marginal values in order to raise the price paid by
the other bidders. This results in a decrease of the budget and of the demand of the other bidders,
and thus a possible decrease of the price charged to the non-truth telling bidder.
Theorem 7. There is no incentive compatible, Pareto optimal, individually rational multi-unit
auction for private diminishing marginal valuations and public budgets.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Let us assume that we have a legal allocation (X ′, p′) that is Pareto superior to (X, p). The
utility of the auctioneer does not decrease. Thus, the sum of the payments of the bidders fulfills∑
i∈I p
′
i ≥
∑
i∈I pi. If
∑
i∈I p
′
i >
∑
i∈I pi then an allocation (X
′, p′′) where
∑
i∈I p
′′
i =
∑
i∈I pi exists,
which is Pareto superior compared to (X, p) as well: simply give the additional payments back to
some of the bidders. Therefore, it suffices to consider the case where
∑
i∈I p
′
i =
∑
i∈I pi.
Let qi =
∑
j∈J αj(x
′
i,j − xi,j) be the weighted capacity change of bidder i. Since (X, p) and
(X ′, p′) are legal allocations,
∑
i∈I xi,j = 1 for all j ∈ J , and
∑
i∈I x
′
i,j = 1 for all j ∈ J . Hence,∑
i∈I qi =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J αj(x
′
i,j − xi,j) =
∑
j∈J αj(
∑
i∈I x
′
i,j −
∑
i∈I xi,j) = 0. It follows that (a)∑
b∈I:qb<0
(−qb) =
∑
i∈I:qi≥0 qi. As
∑
i∈I pi =
∑
i∈I p
′
i it also follows that (b)
∑
b∈I:qb<0
(pb − p
′
b) =∑
i∈I:qi≥0(p
′
i − pi).
We partition the bidders into the following three sets: I− = {b ∈ I|qb < 0}, B
+ = {i ∈ B|qi ≥
0}, and C+ = {i ∈ I \B|qi ≥ 0} = I \ (I
− ∪B+). We will show below that
(A)
∑
b∈I−(pb − p
′
b) ≥
∑
b∈I−(−qbvb) ≥
∑
i∈B+ qivi,
(B)
∑
i∈B+ qivi ≥
∑
i∈B+(p
′
i − pi), and
(C) C+ = ∅.
Since
∑
i∈C+(p
′
i − pi) ≤ 0, (b) implies that
∑
b∈I−(pb − p
′
b) ≤
∑
i∈B+(p
′
i − pi). Combined with
(A) and (B) it follows that
∑
b∈I−(pb − p
′
b) =
∑
i∈B+(p
′
i − pi) and that all the inequalities in (A)
and (B) are actually equations, specifically (c)
∑
b∈I−(−qbvb) =
∑
i∈B+ qivi. Furthermore, (A)
implies that the total change in utility (comparing (X, p) to (X ′, p′)) for all bidders b ∈ I−, which
is
∑
b∈I−(qbvb− p
′
b+ pb), equals 0, and (B) implies that the change in utility for all bidders i ∈ B
+,
which is
∑
i∈B+(qivi− p
′
i+ pi), equals 0. Since C
+ = ∅, this implies that the total change in utility
for all bidders is zero. Since the utility of the auctioneer in (X, p) and in (X ′, p′) does not change
either this give a contradiction to the assumption that (X ′, p′) is Pareto superior to (X, p) and
completes the proof of Theorem 1.
To show (B) note that the increase in payment p′i− pi for a bidder i ∈ B with qi ≥ 0 is at most
qivi, otherwise the utility of the bidder would drop. This shows (B). To show the first inequality
in (A) note that the total drop in payments by a bidder b ∈ I with qb < 0 is at least −qbvb. Thus,∑
b∈I−(pb − p
′
b) ≥
∑
b∈I−(−qbvb).
To show the second inequality in (A) we first show the following claims. Let s = |B+| and let
r(1), r(2), . . . , r(s) be an ordering of the bidders in B+ in increasing order of l(·) such that two
bidders i and i′ with l(i) = l(i′) are ordered by increasing v-value. We show first that r-ordering
orders the bidders by valuation.
Claim 1. For 1 ≤ l < s it holds that vr(l) ≤ vr(l+1).
Proof. Assume by contradiction that vr(l) > vr(l+1) for some 1 ≤ l < s. Since l(r(l)) < l(r(l+1)) ≤
h(r(l + 1)), r(l + 1) ∈ N˜r(l). Since r(l) ∈ B, it follows that vr(l) ≤ vr(l+1). Contradiction!
Note that N˜r(l+1) ⊆ N˜r(l) for 1 ≤ l < s, i.e., a bidder b ∈ I can belong to multiple such sets.
We define for each bidder b ∈ I− a unique “top” i ∈ B+ to whose set N˜i bidder b belongs. More
formally, we define a mapping as follows: Let p(b) := argmaxi∈B+:b∈N˜i r(i) which is the maximum
i ∈ B+ (in r-order) with b ∈ N˜i. Let Ai =
∑
b∈I−∩N˜i:p(b)=i
(−qb). By the definition of the mapping
p we have that (d)
∑
b∈I−∩N˜r(1)
(−qbvb) ≥
∑
b∈I−∩N˜r(1)
(−qbvp(b)) =
∑
i∈B+(
∑
b∈I−∩N˜i:p(b)=i
(−qb))vi
=
∑
i∈B+ Aivi.
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The following claim simply states that all bidders from r(l) to r(s) “receive” all their increases
in weighted capacity from bidders in N˜r(l).
Claim 2. For all 1 ≤ l ≤ s it holds that
∑
l≤t≤sAr(t) =
∑
b∈I−∩N˜r(l)
(−qb) ≥
∑
l≤t≤s qr(t).
Proof. Consider bidders {r(t)|t ∈ {l, . . . , s}} ⊆ B+. We show that bidder i can increase his weighted
capacity in the Pareto superior assignment X ′ only at expenses of the reduction of the weighted
capacity of bidders in N˜i. This in turn implies
∑
b∈I−∩N˜r(l)
(−qb) ≥
∑
l≤t≤s qr(t).
Let us describe the assignment X and the Pareto superior assignmentX ′ by a weighted bipartite
directed graph G = (V,E ∪ E′) with the vertex set V = I ∪ J , the edge sets E = {(i, j) ∈
I × J |xi,j > 0} and E
′ = {(j, i) ∈ J × I|x′i,j > 0}, and the weights wi,j = xi,j ∀(i, j) ∈ I × J and
wj,i = x
′
i,j ∀(j, i) ∈ J×I. Edges from I to J are weighted by the corresponding real-numbered value
xi,j. Edges from J to I are weighted by the corresponding real-numbered value x
′
i,j . Consider a path
π = (i1, j1, i2, j2, . . . , ik−1, jk−1, ik) in the bipartite graph. We say that the path π is an alternating
path of length k with respect to the assignments X and X ′ if (it, jt) ∈ E and (jt, it+1) ∈ E
′ for all
1 ≤ t < k. It is an alternating cycle if i1 = ik. Since for any assignment
∑
i∈I xi,j = 1 ∀j ∈ J , and∑
j∈J xi,j = κi ∀i ∈ I, it holds that∑
j∈J
(wi,j − wj,i) = 0 ∀i ∈ I, and (1)
∑
i∈I
(wi,j − wj,i) = 0 ∀j ∈ J. (2)
We decompose the bipartite graph in a set of at most |I| |J | alternating cycles that we denote
by Π. We start from the edge (i, j) or (j, i) with the lowest weight λ = min(x,y)∈E∪E′ wx,y. We
traverse the bipartite graph starting from edge (x, y) and find a path going from vertex y to vertex
x. This gives us a cycle π. If such a path would not exist we could partition the set of vertices into
three disjoint subsets: V1 contains x and all the start vertices of paths ending at x, V2 contains
y and all the end vertices of a paths starting at y, and V3 contains all the remaining vertices.
The edge (x, y) would be directed from a vertex in V1 to a vertex that is not in V1 and has a
positive weight and no edge would be directed from a vertex that is not in V1 to a vertex in V1.
Thus,
∑
u∈V1,v∈V2∪V3 wu,v > 0 and
∑
u∈V1,v∈V2∪V3 wv,u = 0, which would contradict (1) and (2), and
hence, a cycle π has to exist.
Let us denote by λπ = λ the capacity of cycle π. We then reduce by λπ the weight of all edges
on π and we remove from the bipartite graph all edges with 0 remaining weight. Observe that
equations (1) and (2) still hold for the resulting graph. It is therefore possible to continue this
procedure until the graph is empty.
Given a cycle π = (i1, j1, i2, j2, . . . , ik−1, jk−1, ik), we abuse notation by denoting by π also the
set of bidders {i1, i2, . . . , ik}. For a bidder i ∈ π, let us define tπ(i) and t
′
π(i) such that (i, tπ(i)) ∈ E
and (t′π(i), i) ∈ E
′ are edges of the cycle. We use α(j) for αj , which is the quality of slot j ∈ J .
Given a bidder i ∈ I and a set of alternating cycles Π′ ⊆ Π we define
qi(Π
′) =
∑
π∈Π′:i∈π
λπ(α(t
′
π(i)) − α(tπ(i)))
as the increase of the weighted capacity of bidder i when moving from the assignment X to a new
assignment by the set of cycles Π′. Note that qi = qi(Π) for every bidder i. It holds for each π ∈ Π
that ∑
i∈π
qi({π}) = 0. (3)
13
We prove the claim now by induction on a set of cycles Π. We actually prove the stronger
statement ∑
b∈N˜r(l)\B+:qb(Π)<0
(−qb(Π)) ≥
∑
i∈N˜r(l)\B+:qi(Π)≥0
qi(Π) +
∑
l≤t≤s
qr(t)(Π).
Observe that the statement above can greatly be simplified by observing that all bidders in
N˜r(l) appear in the above inequality. It is therefore enough to prove for each set of cycles Π that∑
i∈N˜r(l)
qi(Π) ≤ 0. (4)
It clearly holds for Π = ∅. Assume it holds for Π, we prove in the following that it then holds also
for Π′ = Π ∪ {π}.
Since ∑
i∈N˜r(l)
qi(Π
′) =
∑
i∈N˜r(l)
qi(Π) +
∑
i∈N˜r(l)∩π
qi({π}), (5)
it is sufficient to prove ∑
i∈N˜r(l)∩π
qi({π}) ≤ 0. (6)
For any bidder s ∈ N˜r(l) and for any bidder i /∈ N˜r(l) it holds that h(i) ≤ l(s). This implies
in turn that any bidder in i ∈ π ∩ N˜r(l) will only increase his weighted capacity when swapping a
fraction of a slot against a fraction of a slot that is assigned to another bidder s ∈ π∩ N˜r(l) in X. It
follows
∑
i∈π\N˜r(l)
qi({π}) ≥ 0. Combined with Equation (3) this yields the proof of the statement
of Equation (6).
We need one more auxiliary lemma before completing the proof of the second inequality of (B).
Claim 3. If (X ′, p′) is a Pareto superior solution to (X, p) then for every 1 ≤ l ≤ s∑
l≤t≤s
Ar(t)vr(t) ≥
∑
l≤t≤s
qr(t)vr(t) +
∑
l≤t≤s
(Ar(t) − qr(t))vr(l).
Proof. We use backwards induction on l. For l = s, it trivially holds that Ar(s)vr(s) ≥ qr(s)vr(s) +
(Ar(s) − qr(s))vr(s).
For l < s, we use the inductive claim for l + 1, Claim 2, and the fact that vr(l+1) ≥ vr(l) ac-
cording to Claim 1. Thus,
∑
l≤t≤sAr(t)vr(t) =
∑
l+1≤t≤sAr(t)vr(t)+Ar(l)vr(l) ≥
∑
l+1≤t≤s qr(t)vr(t)+∑
l+1≤t≤s(Ar(t) − qr(t))vr(l+1) +Ar(l)vr(l) ≥
∑
l≤t≤s qr(t)vr(t)+
∑
l+1≤t≤s(Ar(t) − qr(t))vr(l)+ (Ar(l) −
qr(l))vr(l) =
∑
l≤t≤s qr(t)vr(t) +
∑
l≤t≤s(Ar(t) − qr(t))vr(l).
By Claim 2 it follows that
∑
1≤t≤s(Ar(t)−qr(t)) ≥ 0, and thus, by (d) and Claim 3 it follows that∑
b∈I−(−qb)vb ≥
∑
i∈B+ Aivi =
∑
1≤t≤sAr(t)vr(t) ≥
∑
1≤t≤s qr(t)vr(t) =
∑
i∈B+ qivi. This completes
the proof of the second inequality of (B).
To show (C) assume by contradiction that C+ 6= ∅ and consider two cases that follow from
Claim 2:
Case 1:
∑
i∈B+ Ai >
∑
i∈B+ qi. Combined with (d) and Claim 3 this shows that
∑
b∈I−(−qbvb) ≥∑
i∈B+ Aivi >
∑
i∈B+ qivi. But this is a contradiction to (c) above.
Case 2:
∑
i∈B+ Ai =
∑
i∈B+ qi. Note that
∑
i∈B+ Ai =
∑
b∈I−∩N˜r(1)
(−qb). Then (a) implies∑
b∈I−\N˜r(1)
(−qb) =
∑
i∈C+ qi > 0. By (c)
∑
i∈B+ qivi =
∑
b∈I−(−qbvb) =
∑
b∈I−∩N˜r(1)
(−qbvb)+∑
b∈I−\N˜r(1)
(−qbvb) >
∑
b∈I−∩N˜r(1)
(−qbvb). By Claim 2, Claim 3, and (d) it follows that∑
b∈I−∩N˜r(1)
(−qbvb) ≥
∑
i∈B+ Aivi ≥
∑
i∈B+ qivi, which contradicts the previous statement.
14
B Proof of Theorem 3
Let (X, p) be the allocation computed by the auction and assume by contradiction that there
exists a trading swap, i.e., a sequence of bidders (u = a0, a1, . . . , ak = w) that fulfills the above
conditions. Consider the Pareto superior allocation (X ′, p′) constructed in the proof of Theorem 2.
Define cfi :=
∑
j∈J αjxi,j and c
′
i :=
∑
j∈J αjx
′
i,j for all bidders i. Note that c
′
w = c
f
w− δ, c
′
u = c
f
u+ δ,
and cfi = c
′
i ∀i ∈ I \ {u,w}. Let δ
′ = δ π
π+
> 0.
We construct a modified Pareto superior allocation (X ′′, p′′) with c′′w = c
f
w − δ
′, c′′u = c
f
u + δ
′,
and c′′i = c
f
i ∀i ∈ I \ {u,w}, where c
′′
i =
∑
j∈J αjx
′′
i,j. Specifically, we use the same set of bidders
u = a0, . . . , ak = w, perform the swaps between the same bidders as for (X
′, p′), but use as swap
values τ ′p+1 := τp+1
π
π+
instead of τp+1 and as payments p
′′
u = pu + vwδ
′, p′′w = pw − vwδ
′, and
p′′i = pi for all other bidders i. By the same argument as for (X
′, p′) the allocation (X ′′, p′′) is
Pareto superior to (X, p).
We will show that (X ′′, p′′) can be used to construct a smaller feasible solution to one of the
linear programs solved by Sell. Since the linear program has found the minimal solution this leads
to a contradiction with the assumption that there exists a trading swap in (X, p).
Let bfi := bi − pi be the remaining budget of bidder i at the end of the algorithm. The value
cw of bidder w increases only when procedure Sell returns a non-zero value for γw, where w was
the last parameter when Sell was called, that is, the linear program solved in Sell was trying
to minimize γw. Since c
f
w > c
′′
w, there exists a unique call to procedure Sell with parameters
(I, J, α, κ, v, c, d, w) such that before the execution of the linear program cw ≤ c
′′
w and Sell returns
a value s > 0 such that cw + s > c
′′
w. We call the corresponding linear program LP. Its inputs are
the vectors c, d, and κ, its variables are the matrix X = (xi,j)(i,j)∈I×J and the vector γ. Let π be
the price at the time of the call.
We will show that using (X ′′, p′′) we can construct a feasible solution for this linear program
which outputs a value s′ < s. This leads to the desired contradiction.
We first show the following claim:
Claim 4. Using (X, p) we can find a feasible solution (X, γ˜) to LP that fulfills the following addi-
tional conditions:
• for all bidders i ∈ A \ E with i 6= w and di > d
+
i : γ˜i ≤ di −
bf
i
π
• for all bidders i ∈ A \ E with i 6= w and di = d
+
i : γ˜i ≤ di −
bfi
π+
Proof. We first recall that the case di > d
+
i happens when the LP is computed before the demand
of bidder i has been updated as in line 25 of Auction. The case di = d
+
i happens after the update
has been made for bidder i.
To prove this claim we set γ˜i :=
∑
j∈J αjxi,j − ci = c
f
i − ci. First we show that (X, γ˜) fulfills
the constraints of LP. Since the allocation (X, p) is derived from the last linear program executed
by the algorithm, it fulfills the conditions
∑
i∈I xi,j = 1 ∀j ∈ J and
∑
j∈J xi,j = κi ∀i ∈ I. By
definition
∑
j∈J xi,jαj − γ˜i = ci ∀i ∈ I.
Recall that bfi is the remaining budget of bidder i at the end of the auction, that is, the money
not spent by i. Note that bidder i clinched γ˜i = c
f
i − ci “weighted capacity” after LP was executed.
Case 1: Consider first a bidder i 6= w with di > d
+
i . Note that for bidders of this type the
remaining budget when LP is called is diπ and that these bidders pay a price per “weighted capacity
unit” of at least π for all capacity that was not clinched before LP was executed. Thus, bidder i
pays diπ − b
f
i for all the “weighted capacity” that was not clinched before LP was executed. Thus,
γ˜iπ ≤ diπ − b
f
i.
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Case 2: Consider next a bidder i 6= w with di = d
+
i . Note that for bidders of this type the
remaining budget when LP is called is diπ
+ and that these bidders pay a price per “weighted
capacity unit” of at least π+ for all capacity that was not clinched before LP since they can only
clinch at the price π+ or higher. Note that we know that π+ ≤ vi : Since i ∈ A \ E it holds that
vi > π, and therefore, vi ≥ π
+. Thus, bidder i pays diπ
+ − bfi for all the “weighted capacity”
clinched after LP was executed. Thus, γ˜iπ
+ ≤ diπ
+ − bfi.
Next we define γ′′i =
∑
j∈J x
′′
i,jαj − ci = c
′′
i − ci for all i ∈ I and show that (X
′′, γ′′) is a feasible
solution of LP and that γ′′w < s thus leading to a contradiction. Note that γ
′′
u = γ˜u + δ
′. By
the definition of X ′′ for all i ∈ I it holds that
∑
j∈J x
′′
i,j =
∑
j∈J xi,j = κi as whenever for some
τ with −1 ≤ τ ≤ 1, x′′i,j is set to xi,j + τ for some j ∈ J , x
′′
i,l is set to xi,l − τ for some other
l ∈ J . Additionally for every j ∈ J it holds that
∑
i∈I x
′′
i,j =
∑
i∈I xi,j = 1 as whenever x
′′
ap,j
is set
to xap,j + τ for some τ with −1 ≤ τ ≤ 1, either x
′′
ap+1,j
is set to xap+1,j − τ , or x
′′
ap−1,j
is set to
xap−1,j − τ . Thus (X
′′, γ′′) fulfills constraints (a) and (b) of LP. By the definition of γ′′ constraint
(c) also holds.
For constraint (d) note that for all i ∈ I \{u,w} we know that γ′′i = γ˜i ≤ di, and thus, constraint
(d) holds for such i. For i = w, by definition of a trading swap
∑
j∈J αjx
′′
i,j <
∑
j∈J αjxi,j, and thus,
γ′′w < γ˜w ≤ dw. Hence constraint (d) also holds for i = w. For i = u, we know that γ
′′
u = γ˜u + δ
′
and we have to show that du ≥ γ
′′
u.
Since cfw > cw we know that w is still an active bidder when LP is executed, and thus, vw ≥ π.
Hence, bfu = bu − pu ≥ p
′
u − pu = vwδ ≥ πδ.
By vw ≥ π it follows from the definition of a trading swap that vu > π and that therefore
u ∈ A \ E. Consider first the case that du > d
+
u . By the previous claim it follows that du ≥
γ˜u +
bfu
π
≥ γ˜u + δ = γ
′′
u + δ − δ
′ > γ′′u. Consider next the case that du = d
+
u . By the previous claim
it follows that du ≥ γ˜u +
bfu
π+
≥ γ˜u + δ
π
π+
= γ˜u + δ
′ = γ′′u.
It remains to show that γ′′w < s. Recall that by the definition of LP it holds that cw + s > c
′′
w,
while, by definition of γ′′w, cw + γ
′′
w = c
′′
w. Thus γ
′′
w < s, which leads to the desired contradiction.
C Proof of Lemma 1
We first show the following claim:
Claim 5. For every legal allocation (N, p) in the indivisible case there exists a legal allocation
(X, p) in the divisible case where all the bidders and the auctioneer have the same utility.
Proof. The utility of the auctioneer stays unchanged, since we leave the payments unchanged. We
set xi,j =
|{r∈R|nj,r=i}|
|R| ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J . The utility of bidder i is the same for (N, p) and (X, p),
since the utility of bidder i is
∑
j∈J
αj
|R| |{r ∈ R|nj,r = i}|vi − pi =
∑
j∈J αjxi,jvi − pi for (N, p).
The demand constraint for (N, p) implies κi ≥ maxr∈R |{j ∈ J |nj,r = i}| ≥
|{(j,r)∈J×R|nj,r=i}|
|R| =∑
j∈J
|{r∈R|nj,r=i}|
|R| =
∑
j∈J xi,j, and therefore it implies the demand constraint in (X, p). Since all
the slots are fully assigned to the bidders in (N, p), and consequently for (X, p), it follows that
(X, p) is legal.
Given a probability distribution over legal allocations for the indivisible case, transform each
legal allocation that has a non-zero probability into a legal allocation for the divisible case. Then
create a new allocation for the divisible case by adding up the all of these legal allocations for the
divisible case weighted by the probability distribution. Since the weights are created by a probability
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distribution, they add up to 1, and thus, the resulting combined allocation fulfills Conditions (1)
and (2) of a legal allocation. As the payment is identical to the payment for the indivisible case,
Condition (3) is also fulfilled.
D Construction of the matrices in Section 4
We construct M˜ in the following way: we give every entry (j, c) ∈ J × C of M that has the value
i ∈ I a unique number lj,c that is starting from 1; we assign the same value to two entries (j, c)
and (j′, c′) in M˜ if and only if the corresponding entries in M have the same values (mj,c = mj′,c′)
and their numbers lj,c and lj′,c′ fulfill ⌊
lj,c
|C|⌋ = ⌊
lj′ ,c′
|C| ⌋. To be more concrete, let the indicator
variable δi,j,c = 1 if mj,c = i and δi,j,c = 0 otherwise. We define lj,c :=
∑
(j′,c′)∈Sj,c δmj,c,j′,c′ where
Sj,c = {(j
′, c′) ∈ J × C|(j′ < j) ∨ (j′ = j ∧ c′ ≤ c)} and construct matrix M˜ of size |J | × |C| by
m˜j,c =
(∑mj,c−1
i′=1 κi′
)
+ ⌊
lj,c
|C|⌋+1. The matrix M˜ has the property that all the entries that have an
identical value in M˜ have an identical value in M , but every value appears at most |C| times in M˜ .
Theorem 4 gives the swapping algorithm that is applied to M˜ . The pseudo-code of the algorithm
is presented in the proof of the theorem.
We can now use the swapping algorithm on M˜ and get a matrix M˜ ′ of size |J |× |C| where none
value appears more than once in the same column.
To construct matrix M ′ we simply reproduce the swaps that happened to matrix M˜ on matrix
M . We define the matrix M ′ with size |J | × |C| where m′j,c = min{v ∈ I|
∑v−1
i=1 κi < mj,c}. The
values of the entries of M ′ correspond to the bidders in I and in each column each value i ∈ I
appears at most κi times. This methodology preserves the amount of capacity of each slot j ∈ J
that is allocated to each bidder i ∈ I (i.e., |{c ∈ C|m′j,c = i}| =
∑
c∈C δi,j,c = yi,j ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ J).
E Proof of Theorem 4
Our goal is to find an algorithm that swaps the values between the entries such that each value
appears only once in each column. We define r = |J | and n = |C|. Let the indicator variable
δi,j,c = 1 if mj,c = i, δi,j,c = 0 otherwise. We define the badness of a value i ∈ I as βi(M) =∑
j∈J
∑
c∈C(δi,j,c)−|{c ∈ C|
∑
j∈J δi,j,c > 0}| as the difference between the number of entries which
have value i and the number of columns in which i appears. Moreover, we define by β(M) =∑
i∈I βi(M) the badness of matrix M . When each value appears at most once in each column,
the badness of the matrix is 0. We aim at reducing the badness of the matrix at each sequence of
swaps.
Let us assume that i appears more than once in column a. Then, there exists a column b where i
does not appear at all, because each value appears in at most n entries. For the following operations
we consider only the columns a and b. We now define a sequence of swaps between pairs of entries
of the two columns. We can see the two columns as the two sides of a bipartite graph. We set
vertices A = {a1, . . . , ar} on the left side and vertices B = {b1, . . . , br} on the right side. The values
of the aj and bj are mj,a and mj,b, respectively for all j ∈ J . We set edges {(aj , bj)|j = 1, . . . , r}
from left vertices to right vertices of the same slot, and edges {(bj , ak)|mj,b = mk,a} from right
vertices to left vertices with same value.
We define a swapping alternating path (aj1, bj1 , . . . , ajt , bjt) on the bipartite graph. The path
starts with a vertex of the left side and ends with a vertex of the right side. We start with aj1 , one
of the vertices on the left side with value i, and set i0 = i. Vertex ajk is followed in the path by
vertex bjk . Let mjk,b = ik be the value of vertex bjk . If value ik appears more than once on column
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b then we end the path. Otherwise, we continue to the left with any of the edges (bjk , ajk+1), if any
such edge exists. Finally, we implement t swaps by exchanging the values of the endpoints (ajk , bjk)
of each edge on the path, i.e., we exchange mjk,a with mjk,b.
We prove two claims:
Claim 6. The sequence (i1, . . . , it) does not contain any value more than once and it does not
contain value i0.
Proof. Assume that the path has reached vertex bjk on the right side of the graph. The path
continues to the left side only if the value ik appears only once on the right side. Therefore, the
sequence (i1, . . . , it) contains the values of the vertices on the right side only once. The set does
not contain i0 = i since value i does not appear on b.
Claim 7. The sequence of swaps along the edges (ajk , bjk), k = 1, . . . , t, reduces the total badness
of the matrix by at least 1.
Proof. The first swap of the path reduces the badness of bidder i = i0 by 1, since there exists no
value i on any entry of column b. We now prove that the total badness of bidders {i1, . . . , it} does
not increase. Consider any value ik with k < t. If value ik is moved to entry mjk,a then ik appears
only once in b. However, value ik is also moved from entry mjk+1,a to mjk+1,b. Thus, the badness of
bidder ik does not increase. For value it, that is moved from mjt,b to mjt,a, we observe that either
value it appears more than once in b or that there is no entry on a that contains it. In both cases
the badness of it does not increase.
Algorithm 3 Swapping Algorithm.
1: procedure Swapping(M)
2: J ← {1, . . . , rows(M)}
3: C ← {1, . . . , columns(M)}
4: n← max(j,c)∈J×C mj,c
5: for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
6: jc ← |{j ∈ J |mj,c = i}| ∀c ∈ C
7: while maxc∈C(jc) > 1 do
8: a← min({c ∈ C|jc > 1})
9: b← min({c ∈ C|jc = 0})
10: i′ ← i
11: k ← 0
12: repeat
13: k ← min({j ∈ J \ {k}|mj,a = i
′})
14: mk,a ← mk,b
15: mk,b ← i
′
16: i′ ← mk,a
17: until |{j ∈ J |mj,a = i
′}| = 1 ∨ |{j ∈ J |mj,b = i
′}| > 0
18: ja ← ja − 1
19: jb ← jb + 1
20: end while
21: end for
22: return M
23: end procedure
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The proof of the theorem is therefore completed. Algorithm 3 implements the idea of the swaps
that is described above.
F Proof of Theorem 5
In order to prove Theorem 5 we need the following lemmas and the definition of Pareto equivalent
trading paths.
Lemma 3. Let H and H
′
be two allocations with all items allocated. The symmetric difference
H ⊖H
′
between the two allocations can be decomposed into a set of alternating paths (simple paths
and paths with cycles) with respect to H.
Proof. Let the graph G be a directed graph. The edges from the matching H are directed from
bidders to items and the edges from the matching H
′
are directed from items to bidders. Since H
and H
′
have all items allocated, in both matchings there are m edges for every item. Moreover,
each item in G will have an equal number of incoming and outgoing edges. Thus, no item has to
be the start or the end of a path, and we can always find two edges incident to any item such that
there are no two consecutive edges from H or H
′
.
Proof of Lemma 2. Assume that σ = (a1, t1, . . . , tj−1, aj) is an alternating path with a cycle. Let
sk be the first vertex of the cycle in the order. We decompose the path into σs = (a1, . . . , sk−1, sk),
σc = (sk, sk+1, . . . , si−1, sk), and σe = (sk, si+1, . . . , aj), where sk is either a bidder or an item. If
sk is an item, say t, then sk−1, sk+1, si−1, and si+1 are bidders, and t ∈ Ssk−1, t ∈ Ssk+1, t ∈ Ssi−1 ,
and t ∈ Ssi+1. Moreover, t ∈ Hsk−1, t ∈ Hsi−1, t 6∈ Hsk+1, and t 6∈ Hsi+1 by the definition of an
alternating path. Thus, the concatenation of σs and σe is still an alternating path and it is simple.
In the same way, if sk is a bidder, say a, we have that sk−1, sk+1, si−1, and si+1 are items and
{sk−1, sk+1, si−1, si+1} ⊆ Sa, sk−1 6∈ Ha, si−1 6∈ Ha, sk+1 ∈ Ha, si+1 ∈ Ha. Thus, we can again
concatenate σs and σe and obtain a simple alternating path. The above process can be iterated if
there exist more cycles in the path.
We conclude that for every trading path there is a Pareto equivalent simple trading path and
that if there are no simple trading paths then there are no trading paths at all.
Now we are ready for the proof of Theorem 5. This proof and the proof of Theorem 6 follow
very closely those of [10].
Proof of Theorem 5. Let Q be the predicate that (H, p) is Pareto optimal, R1 be the predicate
that all items are sold in (H, p), and R2 the predicate that there are no trading paths in G with
respect to (H, p). We seek to show that Q⇔ R1 ∧R2.
Q ⇒ (R1 ∧R2): to prove this we show that (¬R1 ∨ ¬R2)⇒ ¬Q.
If both R1 and R2 are true then this becomes False⇒ ¬Q which is trivially true.
If the allocation (H, p) does not assign all items (¬R1) then it is clearly not Pareto optimal
(¬Q). We can get a better allocation by assigning unsold items to any bidder i with such items in
Si. This increases the utility of bidder i.
If ¬R2 then there exists a trading path σ in G with respect to (H, p). Let σ = (a1, t1,
a2, t2, . . . , aj−1, tj−1, aj), with vaj > va1 and b
∗
aj
≥ va1 ; then we can decrease the payment of
bidder a1 by va1 , increase the payment of bidder aj by the same va1 , and move item ti from bidder
ai to bidder ai+1 for all i = 1, . . . , j − 1. In this case, the utility of bidders a1, a2, . . . , aj−1 is
unchanged, the utility of bidder aj increases by vaj − vai > 0, and the utility of the auctioneer
19
is unchanged. The sum of payments by the bidders is likewise unchanged. This contradicts the
assumption that (H, p) is Pareto optimal.
We now seek to prove that (R1 ∧ R2) ⇒ Q. We note above that if not all items are allocated
(¬R1) then the allocation is not Pareto optimal (¬Q), thus Q ⇒ R1 and (trivially) Q ⇒ Q∧ R1
(Pareto optimality implies that all items allocated). Thus, (R1∧R2)⇒ Q⇒ Q∧R1. If R1 is false
this predicate becomes False⇒ False, thus we remain with the case where all items are allocated.
We show the contrapositive: ¬Q ⇒ (¬R1 ∨ ¬R2). Assume ¬Q, i.e., assume that (H, p) is not
Pareto optimal. Further assume R1, that H assigns all items. We will show ¬R2, i.e., that there is
a trading path with respect to (H, p). Since (H, p) is not Pareto optimal, there must be some other
allocation (H ′, p′) that is not worse for all players (including the auctioneer) and strictly better for
at least one player. We can assume that (H ′, p′) assigns all items as well, as otherwise we can take
an even better allocation that would assign all items.
By Lemma 3 we know that H and H ′ are related by a set of alternating paths (simple and
not) and cycles. On a path, the first bidder gives up one item, whereas the last bidder receives
one item more, after items are exchanged along the path. Cycles represent giving up one item in
return for another by passing items around along it. Cycles do not change the number of items
assigned to the bidders along the cycles so we will ignore them. Moreover, by Lemma 2 we know
that every trading path that is not simple has a Pareto equivalent simple trading path and if it
does not exist any simple trading path then there are no trading paths at all. Thus, we can focus
on the existence of simple trading paths. Let us denote the number of alternating paths by z, and
denote the start and end bidders along these z alternating paths by x1, . . . , xz and y1, . . . , yz. We
assume that the same bidder may appear multiple times amongst xi’s or multiple times amongst
yi’s, but cannot appear both as an xi and as a yi, since we can concatenate two such paths into
one. Such an alternating path represents a shuffle of items between bidders where bidder xj loses
an item, and bidder yj gains an item when moving from H to H
′. In general, these two items may
be entirely different.
Assume there are no trading paths with respect to (H, p). Then it must be the case that for each
alternating path j either vyj ≤ vxj holds, b
∗
yj
< vxj holds, or both holds, where b
∗
yj
is the budget
left over for bidder yj at the end of the mechanism. We define µ = {j ∈ {1, . . . , z}|vyj ≤ vxj} and
ν = {1, . . . , z} \ µ.
Now, no bidder is worse off in (H ′, p′) in comparison to (H, p), the auctioneer is not worse off,
and, by assumption, either
(A) some bidder is strictly better off, or
(B) the auctioneer is strictly better off.
First, we rule out case (B) above: Consider the process of changing (H, p) into (H ′, p′) as a two
stage process: at first, the bidders x1, . . . , xz give up items. During this first stage, the payments
made by these bidders must decrease (in sum) by at least Z− =
∑z
i=1 vxi . The second stage is that
bidders y1, . . . , yz receive their extra items. In the second stage, the maximum extra payment that
can be received from bidders y1, . . . , yz is no more than
Z+ =
∑
j∈µ
vyj +
∑
j∈ν
b∗yj ≤
∑
j∈µ
vxj +
∑
j∈ν
vxj = Z
−, (7)
by definition of sets µ and ν above. Thus, the total increase in revenue to the auctioneer would be
Z+ − Z− ≤ 0. This rules out case B. Moreover, as the auctioneer cannot be worse off, Z+ = Z−
and from Equation (7) we conclude that∑
j∈µ
vyj +
∑
j∈ν
b∗yj =
∑
j∈µ
vxj +
∑
j∈ν
vxj . (8)
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By definition, we have for j ∈ µ that vyj ≤ vxj , and for j ∈ ν we have that b
∗
yj
< vxj . Thus, if
ν 6= ∅ then the left hand side of Equation (8) is strictly less than the right hand side, a contradiction.
Therefore, case (A) must hold and it must be that ν = ∅. We will conclude the proof of the theorem
by showing that these two are inconsistent. By (A), we have that |H ′a|va − p
′
a = |Ha|va − pa for
each bidder a whose utility does not increase, |H ′aˆ|vaˆ − p
′
aˆ > |Haˆ|vaˆ − paˆ for at least one bidder aˆ,
and
∑
a∈I p
′
a =
∑
a∈I pa. We can now derive that
∑
a∈I
|H ′a|va >
∑
a∈I
|Ha|va +
(∑
a∈I
p′a −
∑
a∈I
pa
)
,
and hence, ∑
a∈I
(|H ′a| − |Ha|)va > 0. (9)
Now, whenever a = xj for a j ∈ {1, . . . , z} we decrease |H
′
a| − |Ha| by one, whenever a = yj for a
j ∈ {1, . . . , z} we increase |H ′a| − |Ha| by one. Thus, rewriting Equation (9) we get that∑
a∈I
(|{j ∈ {1, . . . , z}|a = yj}| − |{j ∈ {1, . . . , z}|a = xj}|)va > 0,
respectively
z∑
j=1
vyj −
z∑
j=1
vxj > 0.
Hence,
z∑
j=1
vyj >
z∑
j=1
vxj , (10)
but Equation (10) is inconsistent with Equation (8) as ν = ∅ implies that µ = {1, . . . , z}.
G Proof of Theorem 6
We present the proof of Pareto optimality for the auction described in Algorithm 4.
We first state the fact that the auction will sell all slots of all rounds. As stated in Theorem 5,
this is a necessary condition for Pareto optimality.
Lemma 4. If the multiset-union of all preference sets S =
⊎
i∈I Si fulfills U ⊆ S, the auction will
sell all items.
Proof. At the beginning of the auction the price is zero, and thus, every bidder demands his hole
preference set Si, and all slots can be sold. During the auction the demand of bidder i decreases
either when he buys a slot, or when his demand gets updated to D+i . The first case does not affect
the demand for the unsold slots. In the second case, the usage of the B-matching guarantees that
the other bidders demand all the unsold slots at the current price when we decrease i’s demand.
Now we need to show that there are no trading paths in the final allocation (H∗, p∗) produced
by Algorithm 4. Consider the set of all trading paths Σ in the final allocation (H∗, p∗).
Definition 3. We define for every σ ∈ Σ:
• Let Y σ be the S-avoid matching used the first time some item r is sold to some bidder a
where (a, r) is an edge along σ. Y σ is either an E-avoid matching (line 4 of Algorithm 4) or
an a-avoid matching for some bidder-item edge (a, r) along σ (line 7 of Algorithm 4).
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Algorithm 4 Combinatorial Auction with Budgets
1: procedure Combinatorial Auction with Budgets(v, b, (Si)i∈I)
2: π ← 0
3: while A 6= ∅ do
4: Sell(E)
5: A← A− E
6: repeat
7: if ∃i|B(¬{i}) < t¯ then Sell({i})
8: else
9: For an arbitrary bidder i with di > D
+
i (π):
10: di ← D
+
i (π)
11: end if
12: until ∀i: (di = D
+
i (π)) ∧ (B(¬{i}) ≥ t¯)
13: Increase π until for some i, Di(π) 6= D
+
i (π)
14: end while
15: end procedure
Algorithm 5 Compute an Avoid Matching via Min Cost Max Flow
1: procedure S-Avoid Matching
2: Construct interest graph G:
• Each active bidder a ∈ A on the left with capacity constraint da.
• Each unsold item r ∈ R on the right with capacity constraint cr.
• Edge (a, r) from bidder a ∈ A to unsold item r ∈ R iff r ∈ Sa.
3: Return maximal B-matching with minimal number of items assigned to bidders in S,
amongst all maximal B-matchings.
4: end procedure
Algorithm 6 Selling to the Set S of Bidders
1: procedure Sell(S)
2: repeat
3: Compute Y = S-Avoid Matching
4: For arbitrary (a, r) in Y with a ∈ S, sell item r to bidder a and set Sa ← Sa \ {r}.
5: until B(¬S) ≥ t¯
6: end procedure
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• If Y σ is an E-avoid matching, let Eσ be this set of exiting bidders.
• If Y σ is an a-avoid matching, let aσ be this bidder.
• Let F σ ⊆ H∗ be the set of edges (a, r) such that item r was sold to bidder a at or subsequent
to the first time that some item r′ was sold to some bidder a′ for some edge (a′, r′) ∈ σ. The
edge (a′, r′) is itself in F σ.
• Let tσ be the number of unsold instances just before the first time some edge along σ was
sold. That is, tσ is equal to the number of instances matched in F σ.
• Let πσ be the price at which Y σ is computed.
• Let bσa be the remaining budget for bidder a before any item is sold in Sell(E
σ) or Sell(aσ).
We partition Σ into two classes of trading paths:
• ΣE is the set of trading paths such that σ ∈ ΣE iff Y
σ is some Eσ-avoid matching used in
Sell(Eσ) (line 4 of Algorithm 4).
• Σ¬E is the set of trading paths such that σ ∈ Σ¬E iff Y
σ is some aσ-avoid matching used in
Sell({aσ}) (line 7 of Algorithm 4).
Lemma 5. ΣE = ∅.
Proof. We need the following claim:
Claim 8. Let σ = (a1, r2, . . . , aj−1, rj−1, aj) ∈ ΣE be a trading path, and let (ai, ri) be the last edge
belonging to Y σ along σ. Then the suffix of σ starting at ai, (ai, ri, . . . , aj), is itself a trading path.
Proof. This follows as the valuation of ai is equal to the current price π
σ when Sell(Eσ) was
executed, and the valuation of a1 is greater than or equal to π
σ as edge (a1, r1) was unsold prior
to this Sell(Eσ) and does belong to the final F σ.
From the claim above we may assume, without loss of generality, that if ΣE 6= ∅ then ∃σ ∈ ΣE
such that the first edge along σ was also the first edge sold amongst all edges of σ, furthermore, all
subsequent edges do not belong to Y σ.
As no further items will be sold to a bidder a ∈ Eσ after this Sell(Eσ), the number of items
assigned to E-type bidders is equal for Y σ and F σ. We seek a contradiction to the assumption
that Y σ was an Eσ-avoid matching. Note that the matching F σ is an Eσ-avoid matching by itself
because exactly the number of items assigned to E-type bidders in Y σ are being sold to them. We
now show how to construct from F σ another matching that assigns less items to E-type bidders.
We show that the number of items assigned to bidder a1 in F
σ can be reduced by one by giving
bidder ak+1 item rk for k = 1, . . . , j − 1. This is also a full matching but it remains to show that
this does not exceed the capacity constraints daj of bidder aj .
As daj = Daj for all a ∈ A when Sell(E
σ) is executed, bidder aj has a remaining budget
greater than or equal to v1 at the conclusion of the auction, and each item assigned to bidder aj
in F σ is sold to him at a price greater than or equal to πσ = v1, it follows that at the time of
Sell(Eσ) we have that Daj is greater than the number of items assigned to aj in F
σ. Thus, we can
increase the number of items allocated to aj by one without exceeding the demand constraint daj .
Now, note that aj is not an E-type bidder, and the new matching constructed assigns less items
to E-type bidders than the matching F σ. Hence, F σ is not an Eσ-avoid matching, and in turn
neither Y σ is Eσ-avoid matching.
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We have shown that ΣE = ∅. It remains to show that Σ¬E = ∅.
Assume Σ¬E 6= ∅. Order σ ∈ Σ¬E by the first time at which some edge along σ was sold.
We know that this occurs within some Sell({aσ}) for some aσ and that aσ /∈ E. Let us define
σ = (a1, r1, a2, r2, . . . , aj−1, rj−1, aj) be the last path in this order, and let e = (a
σ, rσ) = (ai, ri).
Recall that Y σ is the aσ-avoid matching used when item rσ was sold to bidder aσ. Also,
F σ ⊆ H∗ is the set of edges added to H∗ in the course of the auction from this point on (including
the current Sell({ai})).
Lemma 6. Let σ, aσ = ai, and r
σ = ri be as above, then there was another full matching X when
Y σ was computed as an aσ-avoid matching and X has the following properties:
(a) The suffix of σ from ai to aj :
σ[ai, . . . , aj ] = (ai, ri, ai+1, ri+1, . . . , aj−1, rj−1, aj),
is an alternating path with respect to X (i.e., edges (ak, rk) where i ≤ k ≤ j− 1 belong to X).
(b) The number of items assigned to ai is equal in X and in Y
σ.
(c) The number of items assigned to aj is equal in X and in F
σ.
Proof. We use the notation M(a) for the number of items assigned to bidder a in a matching M .
We know that F σ(ai) ≥ Y
σ(ai) since there is otherwise a contradiction because Y
σ is an ai-avoid
matching.
Notice that if F σ(ai) = Y
σ(ai), it is possible to choose X = F
σ and the conditions above follow
trivially.
Now, consider the case where F σ(ai) > Y
σ(ai). Y
σ and F σ are both matchings that assign all tσ
instances, thus by Lemma 3 we know that the symmetric difference between the two matchings can
by expressed by sets of alternating paths. We consider the smallest such set, i.e., no two alternating
paths can be concatenated. By Lemma 2 we know that we can obtain a Pareto equivalent set of
simple alternating paths with respect to F σ. From the fact that F σ(ai) > Y
σ(ai), we can obtain
δ = F σ(ai) − Y
σ(ai) alternating paths that start from ai. Consider one of this paths, τ = (ai =
g1, s1, g2, s2, . . . , gl), where gk are bidders, sk are items, (gk, sk) ∈ F
σ, and (sk, gk+1) ∈ Y
σ.
We argue that σ[ai, . . . , aj ] and τ are bidder disjoint, besides the first bidder ai. By contradic-
tion, choose u to be the first bidder other to ai in common between τ and σ[ai, . . . , aj ]. For some
i < k′ ≤ j and 1 < k ≤ l we have u = gk = ak′ . Let σ
′
be the concatenation of the prefix of σ up
to ai, followed by the prefix of τ up to gk and followed by the suffix of σ from gk = ak′ to the end.
σ
′
= (a1, r1, . . . , ai = g1, s1, g2, . . . , gk = ak′ , rk′ , ak′+1, . . . , aj)
This is a trading path in F σ and no edge is sold before (ai, ri) in contradiction with the assumption
that σ is the last trading path in the defined order amongst all trading paths. Thus, σ[ai, . . . , aj ]
and τ have the bidder ai in common and the other bidders along the paths are different. It could
be possible that they have some items in common but this is no problem.3 For any such τ = (ai =
g1, s1, g2, s2, . . . , gl), we can move item sk from bidder gk to bidder gk+1 where 1 ≤ k ≤ l−1 without
violating the demand of bidder gl because sl−1 was assigned to gl in Y
σ, and gl is not the first
bidder in another alternating path.
3This is the case because if there are items in common but no bidders unless ai, the edges that belong to σ[ai, . . . , aj ]
are not modified by any τ , so σ[ai, . . . , aj ] will be an alternating path with respect to the X we will define and the
number of items assigned to bidder aj does not change for the same reason.
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As we can do so for all paths τ , we obtain a new full matching X by applying the swaps of all
the alternating paths to F σ. X assigns to ai the same number of items as Y
σ and from the fact
that aj does not appear in any τ , the number of items assigned to him is again F
σ(aj).
Corollary 1. Σ¬E = ∅.
Proof. Assume that Σ¬E 6= ∅, select σ ∈ Σ¬E as in Lemma 6, and let a
σ = ai and r
σ = ri. We now
seek to derive a contradiction as follows:
• when Y σ was computed there was also an alternative full matching Y ′ with fewer items
assigned to bidder ai, contradicting the assumption that Y
σ is an ai-avoid matching, or
• we show that the remaining budget of bidder aj at the end of the auction, b
∗
aj
, has b∗aj < v1,
contradicting the assumption that σ is a trading path.
Let X be a matching as in Lemma 6 and F σ be as defined in Definition 3. Also, let X(a),
F σ(a), be the number of items assigned to bidder a in the full matchings X, F σ, respectively.
We consider the following cases regarding daj when Y
σ, the ai-avoid matching, was computed:
(a) daj > X(aj): Like in Lemma 5, we can decrease the number of items sold to ai by assigning
item rk to bidder ak+1 for k = i, . . . , j − 1, without exceeding the demand constraint daj .
(b) daj = X(aj): We show that b
σ
aj
≤ (X(aj) + 1)π
σ.
• Daj = D
+
aj
: Observe that X(aj) is smaller than the current number of unsold items r¯,
and smaller than the cardinality of the interest set Saj of bidder aj. This follows because
rj−i ∈ Saj , but no instance of rj−1 was sold to bidder aj and an instance of rj−1 is unsold
at that time by the definition of σ. Thus,
X(aj) = daj =
⌊
bσaj
πσ
⌋
>
bσaj
πσ
− 1,
and hence,
bσaj < (X(aj) + 1)π
σ .
• Daj 6= D
+
aj
: Observe that aj /∈ E as vaj > vai and ai /∈ E. As aj /∈ E, the only
reason that Daj 6= D
+
aj
can be that the remaining budget of bidder aj , b
σ
aj
, is an integer
multiple of the current price πσ. Then, D+aj = Daj − 1 and by the same reason as above
Daj = ⌊
bσaj
πσ
⌋. As ⌊
bσaj
πσ
⌋ =
bσaj
πσ
, it follows that
X(aj) = daj ≥ D
+
aj
= Daj − 1 = b
σ
aj
/πσ − 1,
and hence,
bσaj ≤ (X(aj) + 1)π
σ .
Note that the current price πσ < vai because we assume that ai was sold ri as a result of
Sell({ai}) where ai is not an exiting bidder and not of Sell(E). As (ai, ri) was the first
edge that was sold along σ, either r1 was sold to a1 for a price larger than π
σ, or r1 was sold
to a1 at price π
σ as a result of Sell({a1}) where a1 is not an exiting bidder. Thus, π
σ < va1 .
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By Condition (c) of Lemma 6 we can deduce that
bσaj ≤ (X(aj) + 1)π
σ = (F σ(aj) + 1)π
σ .
Bidder aj are sold exactly F
σ(aj) items at a price not lower than π
σ. Hence, at the end of the
auction the remaining budget b∗aj of bidder aj is lesser than or equal to π
σ. This contradicts
the assumption that σ is a trading path since
b∗aj ≤ π
σ < va1 .
H Proof of Theorem 7
We show the impossibility result for the case of two bidders and two items. In order to demonstrate
this theorem we use the following two lemmas. The first one follows closely the one of [10].
Lemma 7. Consider any incentive compatible, Pareto optimal, bidder rational, and auctioneer
rational multi-unit auction with marginal valuation functions that produces an allocation (H, p). If
bidder 1 has positive valuations v1(1) and v1(2) and wins both items then the payment p2 by bidder 2
is zero.
Proof. First, consider the case when v2(1) = 0, v2(2) = 0. Then any Pareto optimal auction has
to assign both items to bidder 1. If any of the items were to be left unassigned, or would be
assigned to bidder 2, we could assign it to bidder 1, without changing any payment. This does
not change the utility of bidder 2, nor the utility of the auctioneer, but would strictly increase the
utility of bidder 1. Because of incentive compatibility, bidder 1 pays p1 = 0. Otherwise, bidder
1 could reduce his reported valuation and attain the item at a lower price. If follows from bidder
rationality that p2 ≤ 0. However, it follows from auctioneer rationality that bidder 1 must pay zero,
as −p2 ≤ p1 = 0. Now, consider the case when both bidders have nonzero valuations. Then for
every instance in which bidder 2 gets no items it must be that p2 = 0. By incentive compatibility
his payment cannot depend on his valuation, and when bidder 2 reported a valuation of zero then
p2 was zero.
Lemma 8. Consider any incentive compatible, Pareto optimal, bidder rational and auctioneer
rational multi-unit auction with budgets and marginal valuation functions: if v1(|R|) > v2(1) and∑|R|
j=1 v2(j) ≤ b1, where |R| is the number of items, then all items will be assigned to bidder 1.
Proof. The lemma follows directly from the definition of Pareto optimality. If an item is assigned
to bidder 2, it follows from the assumptions that:
• v1(|R|) > v2(1)
•
∑|R|
j=1 v2(j) ≤ b1 ⇒
∑|R|
j=1 v2(j)−
∑|R|
j=2 v2(j) ≤ b1 −
∑|R|
j=2 v2(j)⇒ b
∗
1 ≥ v2(1)
The last implication follows from incentive compatibility and bidder rationality. This implies
the existence of a trading path from bidder 2 to bidder 1 and from Theorem 5 we know that the
allocation is not Pareto optimal. It follows that no item can be assigned to bidder 2.
Moreover, we will use the following theorem from [7]. Please note that their definition of
individual-rationality corresponds to our definition of bidder rationality and their definition of no-
positive-transfers corresponds to our definition of auctioneer rationality.
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Theorem 8 (Theorem 4.1 in [7]). Let A be a deterministic truthful mechanism for m items and 2
players with known budgets b1 and b2 that are generic. Assume that A satisfies Pareto-optimality,
individual-rationality, and no-positive-transfers. Then if v1 6= v2 the outcome of A coincides with
that of the clinching auction.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem:
Proof of Theorem 7. Consider the case of two bidders and two items such that: v1(1) = 5,
v1(2) = 5, b1 = 3, v2(1) = 2, v2(2) = 2, and b2 = 11. From the Theorem 8 we know that the
outcome has to be equal to the outcome of the clinching auction of [6]. Thus, both bidders receive
one item at prices p1 = 2 and p2 = 1.5 and the utility for the two bidders are u1 = 5− 2 = 3 and
u2 = 2− 1.5 = 0.5.
Now, assume that the true marginal valuations for bidder 2 are v2(1) = 2 and v2(2) = 1. It
follows from Lemma 8 that all items are assigned to bidder 1. Thus, from Lemma 7, the payment
of bidder 2 will be zero and his utility will be zero too. We conclude that bidder 2 has an incentive
to lie in his marginal valuation function.
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